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Feminism and Economic Inequality
Katharine T. Bartlett†
Introduction
Economic inequality was a key issue in the 2016 presidential
campaign1 and probably influenced the election of Donald Trump.2
It is an issue that is profoundly significant to the growing number
of individuals—disproportionately women and minorities—who
find themselves on the wrong end of the increasingly bi-modal
economic spectrum, and raises serious concerns about the erosion
of the “American dream”3 and the stability and viability of our
democracy.4
Economists, political theorists, sociologists, and
†. A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. It is a
great privilege to have participated in this symposium honoring the most
influential legal feminist scholar of our time—Catharine A. MacKinnon. Thank
you to the editors of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their
many efforts to make it happen.
1. E.g. Josh Boak, Why Income Equality Matters in This Election, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Aug. 18, 2016, 1:24 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/
income-inequality-matters-election/; David Lauter, Income Inequality Emerges as
Key Issue in 2016 Presidential Campaign, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015, 4:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-campaign-income-20150205-story.html;
Kenneth T. Walsh, Class Wars: Presidential Candidates Will Capitalize on the
Electorate’s Frustration., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 8, 2016, 6:00 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2016/01/08/this-election-is-aboutclass-struggle.
2. Zsolt Darvas & Konstantinos Efstathiou, Income Inequality Boosted Trump
Vote, BRUEGEL (Nov. 9, 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/11/income-inequalityboosted-trump-vote/.
3. See David Leonhardt, The American Dream, Quantified at Last, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/opinion/the-american-dreamquantified-at-last.html (summarizing research comparing earnings of those born in
1940, nearly all of whom made more than their parents, with those born in 1980,
only half of whom made more than their parents).
4. See Florian Jung & Uwe Sunde, Income, Inequality, and the Stability of
Democracy—Another Look at the Lipset Hypothesis, 35 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 52, 52
(2014); Jedediah Purdy, Wealth and Democracy, NOMOS (forthcoming), draft at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6196&context=faculty_
scholarship; Erika Eichelberger, The Head of the IMF Says Inequality Threatens
Democracy. Here Are 7 Charts Proving She’s Right., MOTHER JONES (May 28, 2014,
9:59 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2014/05/imf-christine-lagarde-incomeinequality; Ray Williams, Why Income Inequality Threatens Democracy,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/wiredsuccess/201508/why-income-inequality-threatens-democracy. This is not a new
concern. See, e.g., Edward N. Muller, Democracy, Economic Development, and
Income Inequality, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 50, 50 (1988) (finding strong causal
association between income equality and democratic regime stability over time).
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media pundits have kept the issue in the headlines.5 Yet, despite
an impressive strand of earlier feminist work that made economic
analysis central to an understanding of women’s subordination,6
few feminist legal scholars in recent years have had much to say
about it.7 Indeed, one of the central criticisms of feminism today is
For a descriptive analysis of the growing discontent with democracy globally, see
Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Democratic Discontent, 27 J.
DEMOCRACY 5 (July 2016). See also David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy,
Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2014)
(describing the tension between neoliberal market imperatives and “democratic
demands”); Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW LEFT
REV. 5, 5 (2011) (arguing that “the ‘Great Recession’ and the subsequent near
collapse of public finances [is] a manifestation of a basic underlying tension in the
political-economic configuration of advanced-capitalist societies”).
5. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Today’s Inequality Could Easily Become
Tomorrow’s Catastrophe, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/28/upshot/todays-inequality-could-easily-become-tomorrows-catastrophe.
html; Peter Georgescu, Capitalists, Arise: We Need to Deal With Income Inequality,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/opinion/sunday/
capitalists-arise-we-need-to-deal-with-income-inequality.html. Even the Pope has
spoken. Zachary A. Goldfarb & Michelle Boorstein, Pope Francis Denounces
‘Trickle-Down’ Economic Theories in Sharp Criticism of Inequality, WASH. POST
(Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pope-francisdenounces-trickle-down-economic-theories-in-critique-of-inequality/2013/11/26/
e17ffe4e-56b6-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html?utm_term=.64cddd3eafd0;
Alexander C. Kaufman, Pope Francis: ‘Inequality is the Root of Social Evil’,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2014, 2:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/04/28/pope-francis-tweet-inequality_n_5227563.html.
6. Some of the classic feminist works addressing class and economic inequality
from the 1970s include ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE
CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM (1979); SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF
SEX (1971); JULIET MITCHELL, WOMEN’S ESTATE (1973). For a close differentiation
of alternative feminist visions that take account of feminism’s relationship to class
oppression, including Marxism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism, see
generally ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983). On
the relationship between Marxism and feminism, see Heidi I. Hartmann, The
Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union,
in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 172 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S.
Rothenberg eds., 2d ed. 1984) (“The ‘marriage’ of marxism and feminism has been
like the marriage of husband and wife depicted in English common law: Marxism
and feminism are one, and that one is marxism.”).
7. Among the exceptions are feminist legal scholars in the field of labor law.
See, e.g., Marion Crain, Unionism, Law, and the Collective Struggle for Economic
Justice, in WORKING AND LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF ECONOMIC FRAGILITY 101
(Marion Crain & Michael Sherraden eds. 2014). Feminism has been criticized for
some time for its inattention to economic inequality issues. See, e.g., Amelia
Gentleman, Inequality in the Pursuit of Feminism, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2013)
(“[F]eminism . . . has failed working-class women by focusing obsessively on
equality in the boardroom and the faltering race to break the glass ceiling.”). This
failing is not limited to feminist scholars. Despite its commitment to issues of
equality, even this journal, Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice,
has not made wealth or income equality a priority. Indeed, scanning the table of
contents for this journal for the past 20 years, I was surprised to find not a single
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that feminists have too often ignored the pocketbook issues of the
working class, such as labor protections, wages, safety-net issues,
and health care, in favor of advancing the social issues of the more
well-off, like abortion rights, environmentalism, and transgender
bathrooms.8 Even when class issues take center stage, most
progressives have focused on the poor and not the working class.9
This Article celebrates the foundational work of Catharine A.
MacKinnon by identifying the theoretical tools she has given
feminist legal scholars that would be useful in bringing economic
inequality to center stage. It does not itself develop a full theory of
economic inequality—that is both beyond any expertise I bring to
the table and the page limit I have been given. What it does,
instead, is to review the current relationship between legal
feminism and economic inequality issues, outline the deficiencies
in this relationship, and suggest the relevance of the work of

article dedicated specifically to the issue. A 2007 conference on wealth inequality
sponsored by the UNC Center on Poverty, Work, and Opportunity stands out for its
attention to economic inequality. See Wealth Inequality and the Eroding Middle
Class: A Conference of the University of North Carolina Center on Poverty, Work
and Opportunity and the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, 15
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 411 (2008). More recently, see Law and Inequality:
An American Constitutional Society Conference at Yale Law School October 16 and
17, 2015, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (2016). Neither of these conferences
specifically addressed feminism.
8. See, e.g., Kathleen Geier, Inequality Among Women Is Crucial to
Understanding Hillary’s Loss, THE NATION (Nov. 11, 2016), https://
www.thenation.com/article/inequality-between-women-is-crucial-to-understandinghillarys-loss/; see also JEFFREY BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER
OF CITIZEN GROUPS (1999) (describing a shift from the “materialism” of leftist
groups in the past to “post-materialism” of today’s left, which is focused on social
causes); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE
CLASS 145–46 (2010); Gentleman, supra note 7 (contending that feminists have
been too focused on the glass ceiling and not focused enough on working-class
women); Dani Rodrik, The Abdication of the Left, PROJECT SYNDICATE (July 11,
2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/anti-globalization-backlashfrom-right-by-dani-rodrik-2016-07 (“Economists and technocrats on the
left . . . abdicated too easily to market fundamentalism and bought in to [sic] its
central tenets”).
9. As an example, Joan Williams explains that Obamacare—the greatest
progressive achievement of the last eight years—gave health insurance to the poor
while failing to provide subsidies to members of the working class who were not
considered poor enough for state subsidies, and their insurance rates went up.
Over a quarter of poor families receive child-care subsidies which are, Williams
states, largely unavailable to the working class, which serves to breed enormous
resentment of the poor by the lower middle class working poor. Joan C. Williams,
What So Many People Don’t Get About the U.S. Working Class, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Nov. 10, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-so-many-people-dont-get-about-the-us-working-class.
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Catharine A. MacKinnon to move toward a more unified thinking
about gender and economic inequality.
I.

The Statistics

The statistics are familiar and not disputed. The top 1% of
households in this wealthy country pull in one-fifth of the nation’s
income,10 and own nearly 42% of the nation’s wealth.11 As the U.S.
economy has grown over the last thirty-five to forty years,
economic inequality has only increased. From 1980 to 2014 the
average national income grew by 61% yet the average income of
earners in the bottom 50%, adjusted for inflation, has actually
fallen.12 During this same period, income rose an average of 121%
for those in the top 10%, 205% for the top 1%, and 636% for the top
0.001%.13 Nearly 70% of the gains in income since 1980 have gone
to those in the top 10% of the income scale, the lion’s share of
those to the top 1%.14 Today, the average income-earner in the top
1% earns eight times more than the average worker in the bottom
half—a disparity comparable to some of the world’s poorest
economies such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central
African Republic, and Burundi.15
II. Economic Inequality as a Woman’s Issue
When it is said that economic inequality is a woman’s issue,
what is generally meant is that women are disproportionately
poor. And, of course, they are. Women are 32% more likely to be
poor than men, and single mothers are twice as likely to be poor as
single fathers.16 In part, this is due to the gender gap in wages.
Women’s median weekly earnings amount to only 82.5% of men’s

10. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 296 (2014).
11. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States
Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20625, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w20625.pdf.
12. Thomas Piketty et al., Economic Growth in the United States: A Tale of Two
Countries, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Dec. 6, 2016), http://
equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis/economic-growth-in-the-united-states-a-taleof-two-countries/.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. For further detailed data and analysis, see Saez & Zucman, supra note
11.
16. TIMOTHY CASEY, WOMEN’S POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 1 (2014),
https://www.legalmomentum.org/resources/women%E2%80%99s-poverty-unitedstates-2013.
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earnings working the same hours in the same occupations.17
Moreover, women are concentrated in jobs that are the least well
paid, such as secretarial and personal care services, as compared
to the relatively highly paid job categories of construction and
repair services.18 Even within the same industry groups, women
are over-represented in the lower-paying job categories. In the
legal profession, for example, women make up only 33% of
lawyers, while they comprise over 87% of paralegals and legal
assistants.19 Women also have the least control over the terms of
their employment. Some 30% of women face mandatory overtime
they do not want, while many others are forced to accept part-time
rather than full-time employment.20
Another sense in which income inequality might be said to be
a woman’s issue is that women’s political rights appear to
correlate with the health of their nation’s economy. A major
United Nations study in 2014 reported that societies with low
measures of women’s equality have lower growth and weaker
economies, as compared to countries with higher measures of
women’s equality.21
While this association suggests that
improving the rights of women might reduce poverty,22 the matter
is more complex. First, it is not clear that the link between
women’s rights and growth economies is causal; it may be that
healthier economies produce greater measures of equality, but not
vice versa. Second, even if gains in the rights of women facilitate
economic growth, this does not mean that the benefits of economic
growth will flow proportionately to women. Thomas Piketty in his
book Capital in the Twenty-First Century makes a compelling case
that, without the especially rapid growth associated with wars or
great economic shocks, or without significant government
17. The figure is lower among African-American women (90%) and Hispanics
(89%). U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A
DATABOOK 2–3, 61 tbl.16 (2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-data
book/archive/women-in-the-labor-force-a-databook-2015.pdf.
18. Id. at 51, 55, 58, 69, 70, 71 tbls.14 &18.
19. Id. at 37 tbl.11.
20. See Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment Discrimination
Law in the Neoliberal Era, 92 IND. L.J. 1, 53–54 (forthcoming Spring 2017).
21. See U.N. Secretary-General, Framework of Actions for the Follow-up to the
Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and
Development Beyond 2014, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/69/62 (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/ICPD_beyond2014_EN.pdf.
22. The link between women’s political rights and economic vitality is the
premise of advocacy efforts to address poverty by strengthening the rights of
women. See, e.g., MARIA SHRIVER, THE CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE SHRIVER
REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION PUSHES BACK FROM THE BRINK 2 (Olivia Morgan &
Karen Skelton eds. 2014).
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interventions, economic wealth tends to become increasingly
concentrated in the hands of those who already have it.23
Economies may grow alongside improvements in women’s rights,
but women are not necessarily the beneficiaries of this growth.
A third sense in which it might make sense to say that
economic inequality is a woman’s issue is that women’s
subordination is part of a larger complex of interrelated
subordinations in which each system interacts with and reinforces
the other. By this analysis, women’s subordination shapes and is
shaped by the logic and reality of an economic system that creates
vast amounts of income inequality. The supporting ideology of
this economic system is, at once, patriarchal and capitalist. It is
also racist; as with sex, race is a differentiating factor that this
complex of interrelated social systems, including the economic
system, has converted into a basis for subordination.24
When we view gender and class (and race) as interwoven and
mutually reinforcing dimensions of the same set of subordinating
systems, the problem is not only that economic inequality happens
to fall disproportionately on women or even that the effects of the
gender and class systems are cumulative, each making the other
worse. The problem is also that, structurally, one subordination
feeds off and helps to support the other. “Class power produces
gender power,” MacKinnon writes, suggesting that the converse
may also be true.25 Because of the relationships between systems
of subordination, a change in one system of subordination
“ordinarily creates movement, tension, or contradiction in the
other.”26 The systems also help to legitimate one another. By
supporting a particular hierarchy, each system helps to validate
the idea of hierarchy, making the idea of winners and losers seem
increasingly inevitable.

23. Piketty’s theory is that wealth becomes more concentrated in the hands of a
few as the rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy. Unless
economic growth is strong enough to exceed the rate of return on capital, the
benefits of economic growth flow toward those who already have wealth, rather
than to lift the boats of all. See PIKETTY, supra note 10, at 26. Piketty’s work
shows that this is a historical trend made worse by current economic conditions,
not an isolated exception. Id. at 22–25 (summarizing those factors in which
economic circumstances of groups converge and those factors that cause greater
and greater divergence associated with the process of accumulation and
concentration of wealth); id. at 270–85 (providing historical analysis showing that
accelerating levels of inequality are the norm rather than the exception).
24. See Hartmann, supra note 6, at 180.
25. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 31
(1989).
26. See Hartmann, supra note 6, at 180.
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It is this interactive model of subordinating systems that
shapes the vision and analysis of this Article.
III. Feminists and Economic Inequality
Feminists have addressed issues of class and income on
multiple fronts. For example, they have advocated for familyfriendly workplaces to reduce the cost to women of getting
pregnant and being the primary caretakers of their children.27
They have supported affirmative action to remedy past
discrimination.28 They have pushed the principle of equal pay for
equal work.29
They have urged the protection of women’s
reproductive rights,30 safety from rape and domestic violence,31
and freedom from sexual harassment32—all of which improve
27. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WOMEN MEN
WORK FAMILY 207–08 (2015); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY
DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 1–2 (2010); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and
Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1985); Joan C.
Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About Gender and
Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 79 (2009); Joan C.
Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 79 (2003).
28. See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 955 (1996).
29. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work: The Case for Pay
Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 709 (1986); Deborah Thompson
Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17 (2010);
Joan C. Williams & Veta Richardson, New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling? The
Impact of Law Firm Compensation Systems on Women, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 597
(2011).
30. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic
Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1432
(2016) (arguing that state regulations with no health justification that make it
necessary for abortion clinics to close violate the Supreme Court’s protection of
abortion rights); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955, 955 (1984) (arguing that women’s reproductive rights are fundamental to
women’s equality); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive
Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J.
815, 817 (2007) (discussing the “critical understandings and normative
commitments” of a “sex equality approach to reproductive rights”).
31. See, e.g., MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE, supra note
25, at 171–183 (identifying the patriarchal bias in determinations of coercion and
consent under the law of rape); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986)
(discussing myths and biases within criminal rape law); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991) (analyzing the negative effect
notions of privacy have on familial violence toward women).
32. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979) (arguing that sexual harassment is sex discrimination);
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1169, 1172 (1998) (arguing that sexual harassment is a form of sexual
discrimination that “preserve[s] male control and entrench[es] masculine norms in
the workplace”); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49
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women’s economic circumstances. They have also pursued a
number of family law reforms with direct economic benefit for
women.33
In all of these areas, feminist reform efforts have had a
favorable impact on women’s material circumstances. Yet, as has
often been noted, these efforts have helped some women more
than others.34 One reason for this is that the underlying theory
for these efforts has been largely a theory of gender, not class or
economic subordination. Thanks in large part to the work of
Catharine A. MacKinnon, feminists understand how gender works
as a system of subordination. They understand less about
economic subordination. They recognize that there is a system of
women’s gender subordination that has economic consequences
and, increasingly, that sex and race subordination are connected.
But they have not adequately considered the critical role that class
subordination plays in reinforcing and legitimating other forms of
subordination, including subordination based on sex.
IV. The Search for a Theory
Among those who consider economic inequality a severe
societal problem, it is too often thought of as an unfortunate
circumstance that someone—the state, private individuals, or
charitable organizations—should do something about.
This
impulse is fundamentally a moral one. Moral arguments have
helped to mobilize public opinion on a number of issues,35 but they
STAN. L. REV. 691, 762–71 (1997) (arguing that sexual harassment serves as an
underlying factor in the construction of women’s femininity and men’s
masculinity).
33. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wives after
Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REV. 249 (1999) (arguing in favor of property division rules at
divorce that better take account of women’s contributions to the marriage).
34. For an example of the critique, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) and Dorothy Roberts,
Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997); see also
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
37 (1987) (“The women that gender neutrality benefits, and there are some, . . . are
mostly women who have been able to construct a biography that somewhat
approximates the male norm.”).
35. Women’s suffrage and the civil rights of African-Americans, for example,
used moral arguments to advance their campaigns. See Megan Gibson, I Am
Woman, Hear Me Roar: The Suffrage Movement, TIME (Aug. 12, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2088114_2087975_2
087964,00.html; Andrew Mach, Martin Luther King Jr.: 8 Peaceful Protests that
Bolstered Civil Rights, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jan. 15, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0115/Martin-Luther-King-Jr.-8-peacefulprotests-that-bolstered-civil-rights/Montgomery-bus-boycott-1955-56. The “Moral
Monday” movement in North Carolina has been less successful. The movement
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tend to speak only to those who share the same moral premises.
Without a compelling explanation for and diagnosis of a problem
that matches the desired prescription—i.e., a theory—moral
rhetoric lacks both grounding and the power to persuade.
Anti-stereotyping analysis is one potential source of that
theory. Stereotypes about women have been used to explain and
justify many restrictions on women, and exposing those
stereotypes has led to the elimination of many of these
restrictions, especially in the public sphere.36
Similarly,
eliminating stereotypes about the poor—that they are lazy,
irresponsible, and cheat the government whenever they can—can
improve policy solutions with respect to welfare programs,
housing, state control of women’s reproductive decisions, and
education.37
As powerful as anti-stereotyping analysis has been in
improving
opportunities
for
many
women,
however,
generalizations about women, and about the poor, are not always
false, nor are they necessarily the main problem. It is a fact, for
example, that women bear a disproportionate share of caretaking
responsibilities and that they are especially vulnerable to rape and
domestic violence.38 Stereotypes lay beneath these facts, but at so
deep a level that it is not particularly helpful to think in terms of
women’s present reality being due primarily to mistaken
assumptions about them. As Catharine A. MacKinnon has long
stated, the problem for women concerns less whether they are
protests gubernatorial and legislative actions in that state that, in addition to
limiting voting rights, abortion rights, and the rights of the LGBT community, have
widened the income gap between rich and poor, including the former governor’s
refusal to extend Medicaid benefits for the poor and a ramping up of support for
school vouchers while the public education system continues to slide. See Bob
Geary, Pat McCrory’s Refusal to Extend Medicaid Is a Moral Failure, INDY WEEK
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/pat-mccrorys-refusal-to-expandmedicaid-is-a-moral-failure/Content?oid=4627343.
36. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 86 (2010); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender
and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 42 (1975).
37. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Time to Wake Up: Stop Blaming Poverty on the
Poor, SHRIVER REPORT (Jan. 13, 2014), http://shriverreport.org/time-to-wake-upstop-blaming-poverty-on-the-poor-barbara-ehrenreich/.
38. See MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION &
CONTROL, NATIONAL INTIMAE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010
SUMMARY
REPORT
1–2
(2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/
pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN TIME USE
SURVEY—2015 RESULTS 2 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf
(finding that on average women spent more time than men on housework, food
preparation and cleanup, household management, and caring for and helping
household members, including children, and non-household members).

274

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 35: 265

different from, or the same as, men—the question that antistereotyping analysis tries to answer—than how they can equalize
their power in order to more freely define themselves and pursue
their own life courses.39
The reality is that women are subject to a complex web of
traps and contradictions that normalize their relative lack of
autonomy and make it seem like the natural order of things.
Women are valued only through their association with activities
that are themselves not highly valued because of women’s
association with them. Women are raped because they are
vulnerable, and vulnerable because they are raped. These facts of
subordination are reinforced by stereotypes but not fully
determined by them.
Stereotypes are also not the only, or even the main, problem
with being poor. Here, too, the problem is not that stereotypes are
never true,40 but that the poor lack resources, opportunity, and
autonomy.41 Economic inequality, like gender subordination, is a
matter of power, not perception.
Even if anti-stereotyping analysis had the potential to
unsettle many of the foundations of power inequities, that
potential has corroded over time. Legal historian Deborah Dinner
has shown how business interests hijacked the anti-stereotyping
principle in order to advance a deregulatory agenda and unravel
legal protections for labor.42 It is a sign of the success of the
business agenda, Dinner argues, that courts have consistently
limited the anti-stereotyping principle to the claims of individuals
barred from opportunities because of inaccurate assumptions
made about them, and failed to apply the principle when it might
have eliminate inequities targeted against classes of working
women.43 This curtailment is partly explained by the fact that
earlier worker protections for women were based on traditional
stereotypes about women that served as pretexts for keeping
women in their place—giving both stereotypes and worker

39. See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25,
at 218 (“[G]ender is more an inequality of power than a differentiation that is
accurate or inaccurate.”); id. at 229 (“Stereotyping—inaccurate or exaggerated
misreflections—is the archetypal liberal injury.”).
40. See J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN
CRISIS (2016) (chronicling self-defeating behaviors in which many poor people
engage).
41. See Ehrenreich, supra note 37.
42. See Dinner, supra note 20, at 5.
43. Id.
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protections a bad name.44
But when courts found these
protections to be unconstitutional, advocates abandoned them in
favor of an individual-centered anti-stereotyping principle, instead
of reshaping them to support a more robust, gender-neutral set of
protections for the working class. This individualized approach
helped highly educated women get good jobs, Dinner contends, but
has done little for women in low paying, highly fungible and often
unsafe jobs.45
An alternative way to theorize economic inequality is as a
product of race and/or gender subordination. Through statistics
showing racially skewed prison populations, a two-tiered
education system, high minority unemployment figures, and low
minority marriage rates, critical race scholars have shown how
race—and racism—determines winners and losers in all aspects of
life.46
Likewise, by documenting disparities in wages, the
gendered effects of divorce, disproportionate child care
expectations between men and women, and rates of sexual
violence, feminist theorists have tied various types of gender
inequalities to systematic bias against women.47
Although these race and gender critiques powerfully show
how both racism and sexism stack the deck against women and
minorities, they describe the effects of subordination rather than
explain its means of operation and success. Sex and race critiques
prove what motivates—explicitly or implicitly—those who exercise
power in society,48 and predict which particular people occupy the
lowest rungs in social relations.49 This evidence alone, however,
does not show how racism and sexism have been normalized, nor
how these systems cover their tracks as systems. A fuller
44. Id. at 1.
45. Id. at 5.
46. See, e.g., RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? HOW
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011) (examining
the consequences of marriage decline among African Americans); Olatunde C.
Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 374 (2007) (identifying and
analyzing racial disparities and the “complex mechanisms that sustain
contemporary racial inequality”).
47. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 1 (1989) (analyzing how the law “reflects, reinforces, [and] challenges
persistent patterns of inequality”).
48. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.
1998) (analyzing theories of discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (discussing processes of
unintentional discrimination).
49. See Hartmann, supra note 6, at 180.
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economic theory would show not only how power is distributed
along race and gender lines, but also how those who benefit under
that distribution of power get away with it.
What both anti-stereotyping analysis and theories of sexism
and racism lack is direct engagement with the principles and
processes by which the economic system creates and sustains
unfair social hierarchies. Karl Marx exemplified this engagement
in explaining how capitalism creates a class system under which
those endowed with capital are allowed to expropriate the work of
others and reinvest the profits for their own gain, thereby
ensuring the expansion and normalization of their economic
supremacy.50
The global economic system has evolved substantially since
Marx’s time as state institutions and practices helped to manage
or soften the effects of capitalism and economic conditions after
World War II sustained sufficiently rapid economic growth to even
out
its
excesses.51
Globalization,
technological
change,
deregulation, and the privatization of public functions have
weakened those constraints,52 as have state policies committed to
preserving and strengthening “free” markets.53 Capitalism is no
longer a pure system, but current conditions and the ideology that
helps to sustain those conditions borrow directly from that system.
The ideological grounding of today’s economic system is often
referred to as neoliberalism, or market libertarianism.
Neoliberalism is a set of arguments and premises that, according
to David Grewal and Jedediah Purdy, are “united by their
tendency to support market imperatives and unequal economic
power in the context of political conflicts that are characteristic of
the present historical moment.”54 The alternative terminology of
market libertarianism is more descriptive of the ideology’s reliance
on free markets. For present purposes, the two ideologies are the
same.
Both hold that society collectively benefits from
unregulated markets because they are the most efficient means
through which equilibrium is established between what people,
50. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 69–70
(Joseph Katz ed., Samuel Moore trans., Simon & Schuster 1964) (1888); Hartmann,
supra note 6, at 173.
51. See PIKETTY, supra note 10, at 266, 376.
52. See generally PAUL MASON, POSTCAPITALISM: A GUIDE TO OUR FUTURE
(2015) (discussing how changes in information technology have impacted
capitalism).
53. See WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (Patrick Camiller trans. 2014).
54. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 4, at 2.
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pursuing their own preferences, are willing to pay for what other
people, pursuing their own self-interest, are willing to sell.55 This
efficiency depends upon strong property rights and the absence of
government intervention.56 Any state tampering with market
mechanisms, neoliberalists insist, will interfere with the natural
mechanisms that make markets so efficient.57
Neoliberalism has a political dimension as well as an
economic one. It opposes intervention by the state not only
because that interference hinders economic efficiency but also
because it diminishes the liberty of the individual to make choices
based on his or her own preferences, to exercise his or her own
initiative and reap the benefits and losses of that initiative, to
keep what he or she has earned, and to spend it as he or she
pleases.58 The efficiency and liberty rationales work together: the
freedom of individuals to pursue their own preferences and goals
maximizes the wealth and welfare of the community.59 When
markets are so rationalized, it follows that the basis of the state’s
legitimacy is more its ability to enable and improve individual
agency in the market than to facilitate the common welfare.60
V. Market Libertarianism and Feminism
Feminists have attacked the premises of neoliberalism and
market libertarianism from various vantage points. Feminist
sociologists describe the reality that market-supporting policies
have produced—in particular, the increasing gap in economic
security between rich and poor, the disproportionate poverty of
women and children, and the inability of many people to get by on
the resources they have available.61
Politicians argue that
ignoring the poor is not “who we are,”62 and appeal to our self55. Id. at 6.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 173.
58. See, e.g., id. at 13 (“[I]n the picture of economic life that neoliberalism
celebrates, the touchstone act of personal choice is . . . the consumer purchase.”);
see also Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power
for “We the People”, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273 (2016) (arguing that the
constitutional vision of economic minimalism “has supported and rationalized
economic inequality by defining constitutional freedom and justice in terms of
individualized choice”).
59. See Dinner, supra note 20, at 9; Grewal & Purdy, supra note 4, at 10–11.
60. Dinner, supra note 20, at 10.
61. See KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST
NOTHING IN AMERICA (2015); see also BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED:
ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001).
62. David Rutz, 46 Times President Obama Told Americans “That’s Not Who
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interest with arguments that the absence of a genuine opportunity
to work hard, play by the rules, and live decently threatens
democracy.63 Political theorists point out that there is no such
thing as an unregulated market, and that government decisions
about what to legislate, whom to tax, and how to spend are value
choices that help some people at the expense of others.64 Critiques
of neoliberal theory, including feminist economists and legal
scholars, challenge the assumption that all actors in the system
are self-interested and profit-seeking.65 They also challenge the
assumption that tastes are exogenous rather than cultivated
within and by the terms of the system.66 They question theories of
value that accept that what is paid for something is the true
measure of its value,67 assumptions about the efficiency of free
markets,68 and theories of deadweight loss alleged to be caused by
market interference.69 They reject the dichotomy between the
state and the market that underlies free market ideologies,70 as
We Are”, WASH. FREE BEACON (Nov. 30, 2015), http://freebeacon.com/politics/46times-president-obama-told-americans-thats-not-who-we-are/.
63. See Jung & Sunde, supra note 4; Purdy, supra note 4; Eichelberger, supra
note 4; Williams, supra note 4.
64. See, e.g., Alex Marshall, Capitalism and Governments Are Friends After All,
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 25, 2012, 4:18 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/
2012-09-13/capitalism-and-government-are-friends-after-all
(arguing
that
government is “responsible for every aspect of the market economy”); see also
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY
230 (2004) (“[T]he market does not exist independent of law . . . . A system of
background or default rules is required in order that competitive and voluntary
transactions . . . can take place.”).
65. See, e.g., Paula England, Separative and Soluble Selves: Dichotomous
Thinking in Economics, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER,
LAW, & SOCIETY 32, 41 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds.
2005) (“Assuming selfishness in markets fails to account for men’s altruism toward
other men in market behavior, altruism that may work to the disadvantage of
women.”).
66. Id. at 39–40.
67. See Neil H. Buchanan, Playing with Fire: Feminist Legal Theorists and the
Tools of Economics, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS, supra note 65, at
61, 64–66; see also Katharine B. Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s
Household Labor, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS, supra note 65, at
338, 338 (criticizing the assumption that domestic labor should be unpaid).
68. See Buchanan, supra note 67, at 66–68, 85; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Can
Families Be Efficient?: A Feminist Appraisal, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO
ECONOMICUS, supra note 65, at 423, 440 (“Feminist theorists cannot use or accept
efficiency-based arguments for family policy, because they are based on a
descriptive theory premised on the continuation of the traditional gender system in
marriage and in the world outside the family sphere.”).
69. See Buchanan, supra note 67, at 66–68, 85.
70. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Deconstructing the State-Market Divide:
The Rhetoric of Regulation from Workers’ Compensation to the World Trade
Organization, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS, supra note 65, at 147,
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well as prevailing societal myths about independence and
autonomy.71
These critiques provide a corrective to some of the factual
mistakes of neoliberalism, much as feminists in earlier days
corrected some of the mistaken stereotypes about women. This
work is invaluable to an understanding of how the economic
system, like the system that subordinates women, rests on various
attractive-sounding fictions that do not bear up under critical
scrutiny.
What they do not fully provide, however, is an
explanation of how a system built upon such weak foundations
survives. How did we come to think so highly of a system that has
produced such inequalities, and how does such an unequal society
continue to sustain itself?
What feminists are missing with respect to economic
inequality is what Catharine A. MacKinnon gave us in Toward a
Feminist Theory of the State when she explained how a democracy
built on the liberal principles of equality and freedom manages,
despite its high-sounding ideals, to systematically subordinate
women.72 Given the foundational nature of that explanation and
its potential parallels to economic inequality, it makes sense to
dissect the components of MacKinnon’s analysis and see what
parts of it might be useful for a companion feminist theory of
economic inequality. Accordingly, the next section reviews the
basic elements of MacKinnon’s theory of women’s subordination.
The result is not in itself a complete theory. There remain a
number of normative issues to work out concerning such matters
as what constitutes an unacceptable level of economic inequality,
and what the precise relationship between gender and economic
equality is or ought to be. Still, MacKinnon changed the way we
think about theory as well as the way we think about gender. The
power of her analysis makes her theory a good place to start to
build a feminist theory of economic inequality.
VI. Catharine MacKinnon’s Theory of Women’s
Subordination: The Basics
The theory of women’s subordination in Toward a Feminist
Theory of the State contains a number of important components.
Some of these, themselves derived from Marxist critiques of
147–48 (arguing against the neoclassical assumption that markets operate
independently of government).
71. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 64 (challenging the myth of autonomy and
arguing in favor of a collective responsibility theory of dependency).
72. See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25.
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capitalism, are readily available to a contemporary theory of
economic inequality, although this theory need not necessarily be
the specific, totalizing system of Marxism. Others require more
translation and adaptation. This section sets forth the basic
components of MacKinnon’s theory, with suggestions for their
utility to a feminist theory of economic inequality.
First, at the heart of Toward a Feminist Theory of the State is
a robust theory of how the exercise of power disguises itself as
natural, good, and obvious. The phenomenon that power exercises
itself through principles sounding in general welfare was
extensively developed in the context of class struggle by Karl
Marx, whom MacKinnon explicitly credits. MacKinnon’s novel
contribution was to apply to sex the principle that social and
political arrangements that appear to be givens are, in fact, the
result of how power is distributed in society.73 Previously, sex was
off limits to this kind of analysis because it was widely assumed
that sex is a dimension of social relationships that is inherent,
biological and fixed. MacKinnon showed that sex, too, is a reality
constructed through social relations.74
One does not need to be committed to Marxism to see the
centrality of this insight to a critical theory of economic inequality.
Just as feminism is about the distribution of power between men
and women, and only derivatively about sex differences and
stereotyping, class and economic inequality are about how power
is distributed, rather than any inherent differences between rich
and poor.
Second, MacKinnon pointed out how power disguises its own
exercise through a specific set of social activities. For this, again,
she draws heavily on analogies to Marxist theory. Marx theorized
that power is allocated according to one’s position in the wagework system. Owners of the means of production exploit workers
by paying them less than the value of what they produce. They
then accumulate the profits of that exploitation, thereby elevating
themselves to a position from which they can continue to exploit
those who work for them.75 MacKinnon recognized that the
meaning of sex and the social relations it creates are similarly
determined according to how power is allocated within the sex
system. “Sexuality is the social process through which social
relations of gender are created, organized, expressed, and directed,

73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 40.
75. See MARX & ENGELS, supra note 50, at 69–70.

2017]

FEMINISM AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

281

creating the social beings we know as women and men . . . .”76 “As
work is to Marxism,” MacKinnon writes, “sexuality to feminism is
socially constructed yet constructing . . . .”77
MacKinnon also insisted, as did Marx and other critical
theorists, that the relevant unit of social theory analysis is the
group, not the individual.78 This centrality of the group is
sometimes hard to recognize, insofar as power in a liberal system
is exercised through an ideology of the individual. MacKinnon
helped to show that women, despite their enormous diversity as
individuals, were affected similarly as women.79
Fourth, MacKinnon’s theory is a theory of the state. The
state oversees who counts, whose interests matter, and what rules
control how much people get and at whose expense. Even when
the state purports to leave people alone, it distributes resources
and allocates power in the way it chooses to regulate, tax, and
spend. The exercise of its power determines what is legitimate,
and that legitimacy, in turn, both justifies and conceals the
exercise of power.80 Law is both power itself, and power’s mask.81
The problem of economic inequality implicates a number of
issues relating to the state that MacKinnon did not explicitly
address, since class was not her primary concern. These issues
include whether, or to what extent, economic inequality is even a
problem. As Jedediah Purdy observes, if the purpose of the state
is to guarantee an individualistic, free market-based economic
regime, then the economic inequality produced within that regime
is not really a problem.82 If, on the other hand, the state is
committed to the democratic principle of full and equal citizenship,
economic inequality “predispos[es] political judgment in favor of
the present economic regime” and is thus a serious concern.83

3.

76. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at

77. Id.
78. Id. at 38.
79. See id. (“[N]o woman escapes the meaning of being a woman within a social
system that defines one according to gender. . . . Women’s diversity is included in
this definition, rather than undercutting it.”); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 86 (2005) (“An analysis of women that is predicated
on women’s experience is based on observed social conditions, hence can assume no
uniformity of gender, biological or otherwise, because women’s concrete social
experience is not uniform.”).
80. See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25,
at 237.
81. See id.
82. Purdy, supra note 4, at 1.
83. Id. at 12.
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Whether and to what extent economic inequality is a problem also
depends, Purdy explains, upon what goods are freely available,
without purchase.84 If education, health care, and other basic
securities are already guaranteed by the state, economic
inequality is not the same kind of problem as when even the most
basic goods must be purchased in the market.85 Both of these
factors suggest that current levels of economic inequality are
unacceptable, but there remains the question how much inequality
is too much.
A fifth component of MacKinnon’s theory of women’s
subordination is an account of how victims participate in their own
subordination. Women, she argues, often buy into the terms of the
social reality that constructs them.86 Indeed, for MacKinnon, the
genius of the system of sex subordination is its ability to convince
the women exploited by it to accept the system as natural, fair,
and good.87 So, too, are the victims of the economic system often
its biggest supporters.88
Sixth, and critical to MacKinnon’s theory because it offers a
glimpse of the way out of the seemingly airtight system of male
supremacy that she describes, including the co-option of its
victims, MacKinnon takes an approach to knowledge that does not
pretend that knowledge can stand apart from commitments,
experience, and feelings. MacKinnon writes:
Feminism does not begin with the premise that it is
unpremised. It does not aspire to persuade an unpremised
audience, because there is no such audience. Its project is to
uncover and claim as valid the experience of women, the major
content of which is the devalidation of women’s experience.89

This understanding of knowledge as an interested, iterative
process supports an appreciation of politics as local, and gives
84. Id. at 15.
85. Id.
86. See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25,
at 115.
87. Id. at 115–17 (discussing the apparent contradiction between the feminist
account of women’s subordination and some women’s embrace and defense of their
place in a male-dominated system).
88. How else might we explain the support for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election by White, non-college educated women, by a twenty-sevenpoint margin—61% to 34%—despite the lack of any clear alignment between these
women’s economic interests and the goals of a Trump administration? See 2016
Election
Exit
Polls,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
29,
2016),
https://www.
washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/exit-polls/; see Geier, supra note
8.
89. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at
116.
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meaning to the adage that the personal is political. It is an
understanding that is also key to how an economic system
supported by high-minded principles might eventually, through
the collective telling of the experiences of its victims, be undone.
Finally, MacKinnon’s theory explicitly addresses the
relationship between feminism and other forms of subordination,
including class subordination.90 Nearly half of Toward a Feminist
Theory of the State is devoted to the relationship between
feminism and Marxism. MacKinnon asks how two social processes
can both be so fundamental, and whether they are complementary
or cross-cutting.91
She asks to what extent capitalism is
predicated on sex inequality, and whether male dominance is a
creation of capitalism or capitalism is one expression of male
dominance.92 She asks what “it mean[s] for class analysis if a
social group is defined and exploited through means that seem
largely independent of the organization of production” and,
conversely, what “it mean[s] for a sex-based analysis if capitalism
might not be materially altered if it were fully sex integrated or
even controlled by women.”93
MacKinnon does not answer all of these questions. Her focus
throughout Toward a Feminist Theory of the State is the delivery
of a theory of feminism, much of which she explains through its
parallels to the materialist methods of Marxism, without
attempting to propose a full synthesis of the two.94
For
MacKinnon, it is important that feminism retains its own identity
because, as a historical matter, when feminism has merged with
other movements, it has tended to become submerged within the
other movement.95 But she also goes on to discuss the various
terms on which feminist theory and a critique of capitalism might

90. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 34, at 2 (“We
urgently need to comprehend the emerging pattern in which gender, while a
distinct inequality, also contributes to the social embodiment and expression of
race and class inequalities . . . .”).
91. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at
4.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The chapter that comes closest is entitled Attempts at Synthesis, and
explores three alternative models for reconciling feminism and Marxism: “equate
and collapse,” “derive and subordinate,” and “substitute contradictions.” Id. at 60–
80.
95. See id. at 11; see also Hartmann, supra note 6, at 172 (stating similarly that
“[r]ecent
attempts
to
integrate
Marxism
and
feminism
are
unsatisfactory . . . because they subsume the feminist struggle into the larger
struggle against capital.”).
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relate to one another, finding most promising an approach she
calls “substitute contradictions,” in which the “category identified
by each theory is taken as valid by the other and methods are
cross-applied.”96
MacKinnon provides some of the key methodological tools
and insights necessary to achieve a feminist theory of economic
inequality. These insights suggest important connections between
sex and class subordination. They demonstrate that class mobility
for women does not free them of the constraints of gender and,
likewise, that freeing women from gender constraints does not
necessarily free them from class-based or race-based
subordination. They indicate that inequality is not necessarily the
accidental byproduct of a system but often its intended
consequence. They show how subordination can rationalize the
system that produces it by appearing to prove who deserves to
win, and thus how having losers vindicates winners.
The job for a feminist theory of economic inequality is to use
these and other insights to explode the rationalizations that
sustain the interlocking and overlapping systems of sex and class
subordination and thereby to delegitimize the vast inequalities
these systems have produced.
VII.

Targeting Inequality, Not Poverty

In developing a feminist theory of economic inequality, it is
important that the target of the theory be inequality rather than
poverty. The terms are often used interchangeably, but they are
not the same thing.97 Some philosophers say that poverty refers to
an absolute measure of welfare, sometimes referred to as
biological poverty, or what is necessary to stay afloat physically or
medically. Economic inequality, in contrast, is about relative
resources. It is sometimes called social poverty, to highlight its
grounding in social relations rather than some given or natural
order.98 But the distinction between biological and social poverty

63.

96. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at

97. See generally JONATHAN WOLFF ET AL., JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUNDATION, A
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW OF POVERTY (2015), https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/
philosophical-review-poverty (scroll to bottom of page; under “Download” heading,
click “Full Report” button) (providing a breakdown of the numerous ways in which
poverty has been understood by philosophers).
98. See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 266
(2015); see also Brenda Shaw, Poverty: Absolute or Relative, 5 J. APPLIED PHIL. 27,
27 (1988) (“Poverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only in
terms of the concept of relative deprivation.”).
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is misleading. First, minimum standards of adequate food,
shelter, education, and other related basic needs change over time,
shifting both up and down. Who would think today that families
can meet their basic subsistence needs in the U.S. on the average
income in tribal cultures who live off the land? (Or, one might ask,
the minimum wage?) Second, although it is true that poverty
speaks to the amount of resources while economic inequality
speaks to their distribution, poverty definitions are, themselves,
choices society makes about how much is enough. What
constitutes poverty is a judgment call, not an absolute measure.
Poverty is a relationship between people who hold different
positions of power,99 just as equality is.100
The distinction between poverty and inequality matters
because it affects the reasons for acting and thus whether, and
what kind of, action is called for. Poverty is generally understood
as an unfortunate circumstance that, by virtue of it being
unfortunate, we have a moral obligation to address. There may
also be self-serving, pragmatic reasons relating to the prevention
of the costly problems of crime and teenage pregnancy, which are
often associated with poverty.101 But from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty102 to
contemporary defenses of the economic status quo,103 programs
designated as poverty programs have been considered a
99. See TEPPO ESKELINEN, PUTTING GLOBAL POVERTY IN CONTEXT: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON POWER, JUSTICE AND ECONOMY 20 (2009) (stating that
poverty is brought about by political structures or social arrangements rather than
ethical failures or accidents); see also MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS
37 (1974) (stating that “poverty is not a certain small amount of goods,” but “a
relation between people.”).
100. See Samuel Scheffler, Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality, 4
POLITICS, PHIL. & ECON. 5, 17 (2005).
101. See Morgan Kelly, Inequality and Crime, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 530, 530
(2000) (finding a correlation between inequality and violent crime, although not
property crime); Melissa Schettini Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Why Is the Teen
Birth Rate in the United States So High and Why Does It Matter? 18–19 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 17965, 2012), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17965.pdf (finding that poverty causes higher rates of teenage pregnancy).
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Poverty, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
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term=.e9c3f0460ef4; Peter Marcuse, Poverty or Inequality: Does It Matter?,
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manifestation of voluntary generosity toward those most in need of
help from others.
Viewing the problem as one of inequality and maldistribution
redefines the problem, suggesting not only that some people do not
have enough, but also, as a direct result of the inequities that
cause some people to have too little, that some people have too
much.
The underlying inequities create an obligation that
transcends charity. They create a mandatory obligation on the
part of those who have enjoyed favoritism under the existing
systems of privilege. When the problem is simply poverty, it can
be addressed within the terms of the existing economic system;
people who have too much can voluntarily shift some of their
bounty to those who don’t have enough. But if the problem is that
some people have been the beneficiaries of a system that is rigged
in their favor, the only real solution is that the seemingly
beneficent assumptions of the system be exposed and discredited,
and the system changed.
Being charitable toward others may imply something positive
about the quality of a person’s character, and also reflects that
person’s vision of the kind of society in which he or she wishes to
live. Charity is a virtue, but not one that necessarily implies any
negative judgment about the existing political and economic
system. A justice-based view of income inequality also expresses a
commitment about the kind of society we should have,104 but, in
contrast to a charity-based view, it does imply a negative judgment
about the existing political and economic system and a need for
action.
Conclusion
Catharine A. MacKinnon did not ask for empathy on behalf of
women. She did not say “have a heart, you will feel better if you
treat women better, if you pay them as much as you pay men, if
you do not beat them up or rape them; do us a favor, please do not
force them into prostitution and the pornography industry.”
Instead she developed a critique that named the system, explained
how it sustains itself through power and the illusion of freedom,
identified its victims, and named its perpetrators. She made the
link between women’s victimhood and the complex system of
104. See, e.g., Arthur MacEwan, An End in Itself and a Means to Good Ends:
Why Income Equality is Important 8 (Ctr. for Soc. Policy, Working Paper No. 20092, 2009), http://scholarworks.umb.edu/csp_pubs/25/ (making the case for income
equality as an end in itself because “it is a foundation for the type of social relations
that we consider desirable”).
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principles and power relationships that produces that victimhood.
This critique was harder to ignore and did not leave room for
charity or volunteerism. It was an imperative.
So, too, with economic inequality.
As “feminism has
unmasked maleness as a form of power that is both omnipotent
and nonexistent, an unreal thing with very real consequences,”105
so a robust critique of market libertarianism unmasks a system
that is advanced as free and best for us all and reveals that system
as a man-made, exercise of power, with the very real and unjust
consequence of wealth concentration in the hands of the few at the
expense of the rest. The systems of subordination work together.
So should their critiques.

105. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at
125.

